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Understanding U.S. Overseas Military Presence after 
World War II
Takafumi Ohtomo
University of  Tsukuba
In this article, I systematically examine how overseas military bases begin, end, or endure by focusing on 
the United States after World War II. I look at both international and domestic factors and argue that variables 
such as strategic interests, power of  the sending nation (i.e., a superpower stationing its troops overseas), 
regime shift, and technology tend to show links between presence and withdrawal. In addition to the issues 
regarding the opening and closing of  bases, I discuss several factors that prolong U.S. military presence despite 
changes in the international strategic environment. Even though the initial rationale for establishing bases has 
disappeared, the uncertain security environment renders sustained presence. Continued presence is closely 
related to the reasons alliances endure after the Cold War. Like alliances, U.S. presence acts as a hedge against 
uncertainties, and hence immediate withdrawals do not occur. America’s sphere of  inﬂuence and the low costs 
of  presence also contribute to continued presence.
Keywords: overseas military presence, U.S.
1. Introduction
Today, the stationing of  foreign forces in another country is not necessarily an unusual phenomenon. 
Although there were several years when the United States was not present, Cuba’s Guantanamo Bay has 
been used by U.S. forces since 1898. Even advanced industrialized countries like Germany, Japan, the 
United Kingdom, South Korea and Italy have hosted U.S. forces for decades. One could, however, easily 
imagine the peculiarity of  such a situation by attempting to visualize an America that, for example, 
hosted Russian bases. Similarly, it would be quite uneasy for the Chinese to imagine a situation in which 
Japanese bases were established in Chinese cities, but some Chinese domestic laws were not applicable 
to Japanese soldiers. Such hypothetical situations may sound too radical, but even if  the Russians were 
replaced by the more friendly British and the Japanese were replaced by North Koreans, the situation 
could still seem odd.1
When thinking about overseas military presence, three puzzles can be identiﬁed. First, despite the 
peculiarity brieﬂy mentioned above, why do many countries agree to host U.S. bases worldwide? Second, 
the United States provides ﬁnancial and military assistance in order to set up bases in other countries; 
however, despite what might be considered exorbitant assistance, why do some host countries decide to 
close U.S. bases? Third, overseas bases are created to play a certain role such as deterring a particular 
threat or ﬁghting a war; however, even after their main objectives have been accomplished, why do some 
bases continue to exist?
１　Vine also makes a similar point. See his Island of  Shame, 17.
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In spite of  the political and military importance, the literature on U.S. military bases around the 
world is not abundant. Although very informative, many available works are descriptive.2 Kent Calder’s 
Embattled Garrisons is a welcome addition to the literature as it provides more conceptual frameworks 
for understanding overseas military presence.3 Some authors, including Calder, touch upon the issue of  
how bases begin, end, or endure, but not comprehensively.4 The contribution of  this article, therefore, 
lies in providing systematic answers to the above three questions.
When applied to the study of  overseas military presence, balance of  power theory might suggest 
that the rise of  a particular threat for the United States could lead to the establishment of  American 
bases abroad. It also suggests that international events such as the end of  the Cold War could lead to the 
end of  U.S. military presence. However, even when there are no signiﬁcant changes in the international 
structure, some bases disappear. Domestic politics of  the host countries seems to account for such 
phenomena.5 On the other hand, there are cases where overseas military presence continues even after 
the decline of  a threat. Although the initial rationale for setting up bases has disappeared, an uncertain 
future security environment and the need to hedge against potential threats render continued presence. 
In addition, the sphere of  influence and the low cost of  maintaining bases are important factors in 
understanding base endurance. 
The remainder of  this article is organized as follows. First, I examine how balance of  power theory, 
as a ﬁrst cut, predicts where bases would be located. Second, I discuss why overseas military presence 
begins and show some important processes of  base establishment. Third, I lay out some factors that 
end the presence. Fourth, I explore some reasons why bases endure despite changes in the international 
security environment. Fifth and ﬁnally, I discuss some theoretical and policy implications.
2. Balance of Power and Overseas Military Presence: A First Cut
Is there a relationship between how states align and where bases are located? Balance of  power theory 
tells us that when one state becomes too powerful, others will try to counter that threat.6 This theory 
basically is about how states choose friends in the international political arena, and is not a theory about 
overseas military presence. However, as a ﬁrst cut, it can give us a general idea about where bases may 
be located.
Although allies7 do not always keep security commitments, having formal ties often indicates the 
willingness of  the signatories to uphold the agreement. Therefore, it is fair to assume that U.S. bases are 
more likely to be located in countries that have formal alliance ties with the United States. The tendency 
may be understood here by what I call the ‘ally-base nexus’. We ﬁnd this pattern when the concerned 
states share similar strategic interest and when one state agrees to provide the base to the other. For 
example, Japan and the United States signed a security treaty (showing that the two have more or less 
2　For example, Harkavy, Bases Abroad.
3　Calder, Embattled Garrisons. For a summary and comments, see Ohtomo, ‘Book review of  Kent Calder, 
Embattled Garrisons’.
4　There are works that try to answer at least one of  the questions asked here in this article. Cooley’s Base Politics 
mainly looks at how domestic politics affects the closure of  bases. Calder discusses the life cycle of  bases 
(preparation, establishment, expansion, decline, and closure), but the discussion is very brief. See his Embattled 
Garrisons, 68 – 69. Harkavy talks about ‘how bases have been acquired—and retained.’ See his Strategic Basing 
and the Great Powers, 17 – 19.
5　Cooley, Base Politics; Calder, Embattled Garrisons.
6　Another method of  balancing is to build up its own capabilities. See Waltz, Theory of  International Politics; 
Walt, The Origins of  Alliances.
7　Alliance is deﬁned as ‘a formal or informal relationship of  security cooperation between two or more sovereign 
states’. See Walt, The Origins of  Alliances, 1.
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similar strategic interest), and Japan provides bases to U.S. forces in Japan.8 We also find major U.S. 
bases in Germany and South Korea—both close allies of  the United States.
Although balance of  power theory gives us a general idea as to where bases might be set up, a 
few cases do not fit in the ‘ally-base nexus’ category. This is because in some instances, U.S. bases 
can be found in non-ally countries. In those cases, often coercive measures are used to set up bases. 
To understand more about such variations, we need to look into international and domestic factors 
explaining how bases begin, end, and endure (see Table 1).
3. How Bases Begin
International Factors
Strategic Interest : Understanding U.S. strategic interest is essential in grasping why bases are set 
8　Article II of  the 1951 Treaty (‘Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan’, signed 8 September 1951) 
reads, ‘Japan will not grant, without the prior consent of  the United States of  America, any bases or any rights, 
power, or authority whatsoever, in or relating to bases or the right of  garrison or of  maneuver or transit of  
ground, air, or naval forces to any third Power’. Moreover, Article VI of  the 1960 Treaty (‘Treaty of  Mutual 
Cooperation and Security Between the United States and Japan’, signed January 19, 1960) reads, ‘For the purpose 
of  contributing to the security of  Japan and the maintenance of  international peace and security in the Far East, 
the United States of  America is granted the use of  its land, air, and naval forces of  facilities and areas in Japan’.
Table 1.  International and Domestic Factors explaining How Bases Begin, End, or Endure
How Bases Begin End Endure
International Factors
(US) (US) (US)
Strategic Interest Changes in the Strategic Interes Hedge against Future 
         Uncertainties and Potential
         Threats
 Declining Power of  the Sending Nations
  Sphere of  Inﬂuence/Backyard
  
(US＆Host) (US＆Host)
Common Strategic Interest**a Disappearance of  Common Strategic
    Interest*a
[Processes of  base establishment]
      Outright Conquest   
      Defeat and Occupy
      Hand Down
      Remove Original Inhabitants 
      Payment
Domestic Factors
(US) (US) 
Expansionist Policy*b Isolationist Policy**b
(Host) (Host)
Pro-U.S. (or Sending Nation) Anti-U.S. (or Sending Nation ) Regime 
      Regime Shift        Shift/Revolution 
 Nationalism (Host)
  Low Cost of  Presence
Other Factors
(US) (US)
Technological Advancement Further Technological Advancement
Notes: *  Factors *a (Disappearance of  Common Strategic Interest) and *b (Expansionist Policy) will not be discussed 
in an independent section. 
**  In the section where factors ** a (Common Strategic Interest) and **b (Isolationist Policy) are  discussed, 
factors *a and *b will brieﬂy be mentioned.
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up. In general, if  there is a need to counter a particular threat, and having a base near the enemy seems 
helpful in defeating the enemy, then there will be an incentive for the great powers like the United States 
to set up a base. 
As discussed, bases could be located on the soil of  friendly states or even in hostile states (e.g., 
Afghanistan and Iraq), but why would having a base contribute to achieving U.S. interests? This evokes 
the question of  the roles bases play. Among many, the roles would include deterring threats, ﬁghting 
wars, collecting intelligence, exercises, and transit.9
When the United States alone is interested in establishing bases, forcible means tend to be applied 
to secure a base, especially in the early years of  base establishment. I return to this point later in this 
section. There are also cases where both the United States and the host countries share a common 
strategic interest in establishing bases to counter a common threat. In such cases, less forcible means are 
applied.
Common Strategic Interest : The relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom is 
a good example. U.S. bases in the United Kingdom began during World War II, and U.S. soldiers have 
been stationed there since.10 Having fought with the United States in the Korean War (1950 – 1953), South 
Korea hosts U.S. forces. Occasionally, there are protests among the Korean citizens, and some have called 
for the withdrawal of  U.S. forces. However, the basic consensus among the veterans has been to maintain 
U.S. presence in South Korea.11 The North Korean threat still binds the two countries, and because of  the 
common interest, U.S. bases remain in South Korea.
Although countries like Germany and Japan were enemies during World War II, they shared common 
strategic interests with the United States during the Cold War.12 Today, the United States continues 
to station its forces in Japan, as both agree that the rise of  China and the North Korean threat are a 
common security concern. Germany also hosts many U.S. soldiers although the need for U.S. presence 
in the region is declining. In general, the disappearance of  common strategic interest, on the other hand, 
would be an adverse factor, weakening the rationale to set up bases.
Processes of  Base Establishment
In addition to the reasons bases are set up, it is essential to explore the processes of  base 
establishment, because an agreement among concerned states is not the only way to start a presence. 
Such processes include (1) outright conquest, (2) defeat and occupy, (3) hand down, (4) forceful removal 
of  the original inhabitants, and (5) payment. These are ideal classiﬁcations and not mutually exclusive, 
but let us examine each in turn.
Outright conquest :13 In this case, a powerful country forcefully occupies the land of  a weaker country 
and sets up bases. For great powers, outright conquest is perhaps the most direct way to acquire bases 
overseas, although the purpose of  conquest often goes beyond the establishment of  bases. ‘Receiving’ 
countries (i.e., ‘host’ countries) become a target of  great powers because of  their strategic value or 
because of  their mere weakness or both.
An important point is that conquered countries did not necessarily declare war on the United States 
9　Ohtomo, ‘Reisengo no doumei’, 63 – 71.
10　Duke, U.S. Defence Bases in the United Kingdom.
11　Fisher, ‘Thousands rally for, against U.S. Presence in South Korea’.
12　To be sure, it is rare for two or more countries to have harmonious strategic interest. It is just that those states’ 
shared interests are strong enough to bring them together. Another point is that the interest at the state level and 
at the individual (citizen’s) level tend to be different. While the Japanese government prefers to have U.S. forces in 
Japan, citizens living near U.S. bases may have different preferences.
13　The term ‘outright conquest’ is used in Harkavy, Strategic Basing and the Great Powers, 17. 
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nor did they pose serious security threats. In other words, the U.S. military presence was a result of  the 
U.S. imperialistic expansions, and not necessarily to counter threats.14 Hence, how this type of  presence 
started has relatively less to do with the balance of  power logic.15 This clearly reﬂects simple power 
relations between the United States and the conquered.
The Cuban case is a good example.16 Located south of  the United States, this Spanish-controlled 
island was attacked by the United States in 1898. The attack was a result of  Spain’s sinking a U.S. ship. 
However, whether Spain actually sank the ship is not clear; it is likely that the United States falsely 
accused Spain to justify attacking Cuba. In this Spanish-American War of  1898, the United States also 
attacked other Spanish colonies, including the Philippines, Guam, and Puerto Rico, and set up bases. 
Defeat and occupy: This usually occurs when a war is fought between a great power and its enemy, 
and after the defeat of  the enemy, the victor (the great power) occupies the land and sets up bases. This 
might sound similar to outright conquest, as both involve ﬁghting. The difference, however, is that the 
relationship between the sending country and the host country is initially characterized as one of  enmity.
Japan and Germany after World War II are a good example. After some years of  occupation, U.S. 
forces remained in these countries to deter a possible Soviet attack. U.S. presence also showed America’s 
willingness to defend these countries through conventional and nuclear weapons. Once targets of  
destruction, Germany and Japan became allies of  the United States. They provided U.S. forces with 
useful bases that were needed to counter a new threat—the Soviet Union. Japan and Germany on their 
part saw the presence of  the U.S. forces necessary for maintaining their security.
Hand down: Hand down takes place when a sending nation can no longer afford to maintain its 
current overseas base system. The declining great power either simply leaves the host nation or hands 
its bases down to another country. The new powerful country inherits them and uses the bases to serve 
its own needs. For the new sending nation, it is a cheaper way to start a presence, because the initial 
start-up costs are paid by the former occupant.17
Newfoundland, Bermuda, the Bahamas, Jamaica, St Lucia, Trinidad, Antigua, and British 
Guiana provide good examples. These were originally British territories, but due to financial as 
well as security problems it faced during World War II, the United Kingdom asked the United 
States to provide 50 old destroyers ‘in exchange for the use of  naval and air bases in eight 
British possessions on the Avalon Peninsula, the coast of  Newfoundland and on the Great Bay of  
Bermuda’.18 The so-called Destroyers-for-bases Agreement was signed between the United States 
and the United Kingdom in 1940. U.S. access to bases was further extended to other locations 
during the negotiation, including the Bahamas, Jamaica, St Lucia, Trinidad, Antigua, and British 
Guiana. The lease was guaranteed free for 99 years.
Remove original inhabitants: This is another instance that involves securing a base not by employing 
14　Zakaria argues that the United States expanded at the turn of  the twentieth century, not because it faced 
external threat. See his From Wealth to Power. In it, he challenges Walt’s balance of  threat theory, but Lynn-
Jones criticizes Zakaria for deducing a wrong hypothesis from the theory and applying it to the discussion of  U.S. 
expansion. See Lynn-Jones, ‘Realism and America’s Rise: A Review Essay’.
15　Of  course, the attempts to occupy foreign lands may have been caused by the fear of  other rival countries trying 
to occupy the same land; hence, the balance of  power logic may be in effect. However, here we are interested in 
whether the conquered (targeted) state itself  poses direct security threats to the United States.
16　However, Cuba during the Cold War was considered as a threat, but initially it was not necessarily seen as a 
threat.
17　America’s global base structure was created in a matter of  years, while the United Kingdom’s took much longer. 
The latecomer, the U.S., had an advantage. For the original argument explaining how the latecomers have the 
advantage in the economic development, see Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective.
18　‘WW2 People’s War’, BBC.
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direct military force, but rather by the use of  coercive measures against local citizens of  a weak country 
or group. This is particularly possible on small islands where the number of  inhabitants is not extremely 
large and when alternative land where they can live after relocation is available.19
The case in point is Diego Garcia, an island located 1,000 miles south of  India.20 In recent years, Diego 
Garcia has attracted global attention, as it was used for operations to attack the Taliban in Afghanistan 
after 9/11. Here, the original inhabitants were forced to move to the western Indian Ocean islands of  
Mauritius and the Seychelles during the Cold War, and they have not been allowed to return to their 
homes since.
Some people in Okinawa were also removed from their homes so that the U.S. could build bases. 
Although the Japanese government compensated for the losses, the Okinawan case does not differ 
much from that of  Diego Garcia in the loss of  land and homes. In 2006, people in South Korea were also 
forcefully removed to make space for the expansion of  the U.S. base in Pyongtaek.21
Payment (economic and military): Great power presence can be permitted when the sending nation 
and the host nation agree on the terms of  compensation paid to the host country.22 The host country may 
not necessarily share the same level of  strategic interest as the basing nation, but it may nonetheless 
agree to offer base sites because of  the benefit gained in economic and military assistance.23 The 
Philippines, Turkey, and Spain have been the main recipients of  U.S. aid. (Often such payments went to 
dictators.) Moreover, Russia has naval bases in Ukraine, and the two countries agreed to extend the lease 
for additional 25 years on 21 April 2010. In return, Russia agreed to cut the price of  natural gas by about 
30 percent.24
Domestic Factors
Pro-U.S. (or sending nation) Regime Shift: Bases can be available to the sending nation when there is 
a change of  government in the host country. This occurs when a pro-sending nation government defeats 
the previous government that opposed the use of  the base by foreign powers. The previous policy is 
reversed and the use of  the base is now allowed. For example, President Viktor A Yushchenko initially 
decided that Ukraine’s bases would not be leased to Russia after 2017 when the term was scheduled to 
expire. However, after the new president Viktor F. Yanukovich came into power, the new government 
extended the lease beyond 2017.25 
Other Factors
Technological Advancement: Technological advancement can be another reason for establishing bases. 
19　This of  course does not mean that such relocation is cost-free for the original inhabitants.
20　For an excellent study, see Vine, Island of  Shame.
21　‘U.S. Move Is Spurring Evictions in S. Korea’, The Washington Post, Associated Press.
22　See Clarke, O’Connor, and Ellis, Send Guns and Money, 149 – 168.
23　Financial and other incentives contribute to the willingness on the part of  the receiving countries to host the 
United States, but at the same time, bargaining involving payment sometimes could fail, and it seems to be 
failing more so, especially after the end of  the Cold War. What seems to be happening is that potential host 
nations are bargaining too hard, hoping to get the most out of  the deal, but they do not adequately grasp that 
the United States is no longer operating under the Cold War zero-sum environment. There is not enough pressure 
for the United States to reluctantly accept host nation’s extravagant demands as the United States now has 
relatively wider choices for potential host nations, including countries that were previously in the Soviet camp. 
In other words, America could enjoy an added luxury to choose from other nearby candidates if  the current 
negotiation seems to be failing. Negotiations involving the United States, Russia, and Kirgizstan are instructive. 
See Cooley, ‘The Price of  Access’.
24　‘Ukraine President Extends Lease on Russian Naval Base’, International Herald Tribune.
25　Levy, ‘Ukraine Woos Russia with Lease Deal’; Harding, ‘Ukraine Extends Lease for Russian’s Black Sea Fleet’.
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The need for coal stations for naval ships was one of  the ﬁrst rationales for setting up bases overseas. 
The advancement of  aero craft technology required airﬁelds in various parts of  the world. The post-
World War II plan devised by the United States is a good example. U.S. military leaders were keen on 
acquiring overseas air bases for the purpose of  long-distance force projection. In addition to the military 
use, commercial purposes were important in developing airﬁelds overseas in the post-war era.26 
Advancement in intelligence technologies also called for the establishment of  bases around the globe. 
Intelligence facilities were built in English-speaking countries to track communications.27 Some bases 
were established to detect nuclear testing.
4. How Bases End
I now turn to factors that contribute to the closure of  U.S. bases overseas.
The factors include (1) changes in the strategic interest, (2) declining power of  the sending nations, 
(3) disappearance of  common strategic interest, (4) isolationist policy of  the United States, (5) anti-U.S. 
regime shift/revolution, (6) nationalism, and (7) further technological advancement.
International Factors
Changes in the strategic interest: Once the strategic significance of  a base disappears, the basing 
nation may decide to withdraw. The decline in the strategic signiﬁcance is most likely to be caused by 
shifts in the international structure such as the end of  the Cold War. Iceland is one country that has 
been affected by such a change. Initially, the Nazis occupied Iceland during World War II, but the British 
pushed them out. Later, U.S. forces landed on Iceland and remained until 2006. During the Cold War, 
Iceland was an important naval base for U.S. submarines for carrying out submarine warfare against 
the Soviet Union.
The bases in Iceland have become less relevant in the present security environment. According to 
Rear Admiral Noel Preston, a European regional commander of  the Navy, ‘“Now the world has changed, 
and we are facing a war on terrorism. We are changing how we plan and prepare for this war’”.28 Also 
according to Stratfor, an American global intelligence company, ‘[i]n terms of  sheer volume, the threat 
has almost completely evaporated”’.29 In March 2006, the United States announced its decision to close 
down the bases in Iceland, and U.S. service members left on September 30, 2006.
Declining power of  the sending nations: Sending nations might have been quite powerful and wealthy 
when they first established bases around the globe. However, once their national power declines to 
the point that maintaining overseas bases becomes impossible, they decide to let them go. The British 
Empire is a case in point. As discussed in the previous section, no longer able to maintain its own bases 
around the world, the United Kingdom shifted base management to the United States. It was a beginning 
for the U.S. control of  worldwide overseas bases, but at the same time, it was an end for the British base 
system. The term ‘imperial overstretch’ coined by Paul Kennedy provides a useful concept in thinking 
about this issue.30
Domestic Factors
Isolationist Policy of  the United States: Domestic politics of  host nations have been the focus of  
26　Converse, III, ‘United States Plans for a Postwar Overseas Military Bases System’.
27　Richelson, The US Intelligence Community.
28　‘US Military Set to Quit Iceland’, BBC.
29　Strategic Forecasting, ‘The End of  an Era’.
30　Kennedy, The Rise and the Fall of  Great Powers.
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study,31 but domestic politics of  the United States are also important in understanding overseas military 
presence.
First, different types of  strategic thinking in the United States affect U.S. global military presence. 
While there are those who advocate more presence abroad (expansionists/maximalists), some call for 
minimal engagement (isolationists/minimalists). Liberals who seek to spread democracy and the rules of  
law are more willing to engage in foreign missions than minimalists, while realists do not advocate total 
withdrawal but call for engagement when a regional hegemon is likely to be on the rise.32 The power 
balance among the key policymakers will inﬂuence whether an expansionist or an isolationist policy 
is adopted. If  the power balance tips toward those who prefer an isolationist (minimalist) policy, the 
likelihood of  U.S. troops withdrawing from the world will rise. America’s ﬁnancial problems could also 
strengthen isolationist views, as overseas military activities are costly. 
Moreover, the sense of  uneven burden sharing in security affairs affects U.S. overseas military 
presence. Some in the United States are dissatisﬁed that U.S. soldiers are asked to defend, for example, 
Japan, while the reverse is not necessarily the case. A typical reasoning is that the United States should 
not help Japan when Japan is simply free-riding on U.S. protection. These opinions are expressed from 
time to time and are used as a rationale for withdrawing U.S. troops from Japan, or to pressure Japan to 
contribute more militarily and ﬁnancially.
Anti-U.S. regime shift/revolution: When the previous government that was backed by the United 
States is replaced by a new government that tries to distance itself  from U.S. influence, American 
military presence will be negatively affected. This type of  regime shift in a host nation often leads to the 
end of  U.S. military presence.
Revolution can also change the strategic environment dramatically as was witnessed in the case of  
the Iranian Revolution.33 In this case, a pro-American regime was replaced by a strong anti-American 
government. Friendly relations were suddenly over and the prospects for continued U.S. presence ended 
quickly.
Nationalism: Nationalism also works against continued U.S. presence. Having another country’s 
military base in a sovereign country is an unusual circumstance. As such, it has the potential to easily 
ignite nationalism. An accident that killed Korean schoolgirls in 2002 set off  a massive demonstration 
calling for the withdrawal of  U.S. forces. The rape of  an Okinawan schoolgirl also caused a massive 
demonstration and led to the agreement in 1996 between the two governments to shut down Futenma 
air base, although that has not yet happened.
Other Factors
Further technological advancement: Technology could reduce the need for bases overseas. As 
discussed above, the advancement of  the aerospace technology required many airfields for stopover, 
but further technological improvements enabled planes to travel longer distances. For instance in 1991, 
‘the U.S. B-52 bombers, with the aide of  tankers, conducted bombing raids over Iraq all the way from 
a base in Louisiana’.34 Similarly, nuclear-powered submarines can spend more time under the sea than 
conventional submarines can, thereby needing fewer bases.
The above factors do not always lead to the instant end of  military presence, but they surely 
contribute to the decision to withdraw U.S. troops.
31　See Cooley, Base Politics; Calder, Embattled Garrison.
32　Art, Grand Strategy for America.
33　For the argument that revolution quickly changes the security environment, as well as the relationship between 
revolution and the likelihood of  war, see Walt, Revolution and War.
34　Harkavy, Strategic Basing and the Great Powers, 26.
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5. Why Some Overseas Bases Continue
When the factors that created the bases in the ﬁrst place disappear, bases lose their raison d’être. In 
some instances, bases disappear, but not in other cases. Despite the shift in international structure, some 
bases continue. Three factors seem important: (1) hedge against uncertainties and potential threats, (2) 
sphere of  influence/backyard, and (3) the low cost of  presence. The underlying assumption of  these 
arguments is that the purposes of  bases could change over time, and that the United States would use 
the bases to advance its power/inﬂuence even when there is no immediate threat.35 
International Factors
Hedge against future uncertainties and potential threats: Although a change in strategic environment 
would make some bases seem obsolete, it does not necessarily lead to the immediate and complete 
withdrawal, particularly when the effects of  a change in the international structure are expected to 
create many uncertainties. 
The resurgence of  Russia was one of  the initial concerns for the post-Cold War United States and 
its allies; thus a hedge against such possibilities was essential. While the overall number of  U.S. forces 
stationed overseas indeed dropped notably, Europe and Asia each maintained about 10,000 U.S. troops 
for some time in order to deal with future uncertainties.36
NATO and the U.S.-Japan alliance have not disappeared, as they are considered useful even today.37 
Like alliances created during the Cold War, bases are considered valuable in dealing with the post-Cold-
War strategic environment, and thus they remain. To be sure, there are close links between alliances and 
bases since many alliance agreements allow U.S. forces to use the bases located in the allies’ territories. 
As alliances continue, U.S. presence overseas also continues.38
Sphere of  influence/Backyard: Some bases seem unaffected by changes in the international 
strategic environment. This is especially true when the bases are located near a great power or in 
its sphere of  influence. The U.S. base in Cuba is a case in point. Despite changes in the international 
security environment in the past hundred years or so, U.S. troops continue to be stationed at 
Guantanamo Bay. This phenomenon is the result of  the significant power imbalances between the 
two countries. The global shift in balance of  power seems not to influence presence patterns in this 
case.
 
Domestic Factors
Low cost: Financial support by the host nation contributes to the continued use of  bases. Host nation 
35　Labs, ‘Beyond Victory’.
36　U.S. Department of  Defense, East Asia Strategy Report.
37　For the discussions of  why the Cold War alliances endure in the post-Cold War era, see Hellmann and Wolf, 
‘Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Future of  NATO’; Wallander, ‘Institutional Assets and 
Adaptability’; Walt, ‘Why Alliances Endure or Collapse’; Glaser, ‘Why NATO is Still Best’ ; Medeiros, ‘Strategic 
Hedging and the Future of  Asia-Paciﬁc Stability’; Ohtomo, ‘Bandwagoning to Dampen Suspicion’.
38　At the same time, if  U.S. commitment becomes less certain than it was during the Cold War, U.S. forces could 
decide to withdraw from Japan. In that case, Japan would be without U.S. physical protection and therefore 
would be vulnerable. In such a circumstance, Japan cannot help but to strengthen its own military. Japan, 
however, acknowledges that doing so would be costly both politically and economically. If  Japan were to 
enhance its military, neighboring states would ﬁnd Japan’s move to be a sign of  aggressiveness, igniting security 
competition among major states in the region. Moreover, if  Japan indeed built up its own military to compensate 
for the loss of  U.S. presence, more money would be spent when Japan is financially in trouble. Due to such 
political and economic disadvantages, Japan would prefer to have the United States stay. For a discussion as to 
the ideal way to create a stable Europe after the Cold War, see Mearsheimer, ‘Back to the Future’.
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support in Japan is a good example. For instance, in 2002, the Japanese government provided about 
$4,400 million to support U.S. presence, offsetting about 75 percent of  the total stationing cost.39 This 
amount is about half  the total support provided by the rest of  the host nations combined. The larger the 
amount the host country is willing to shoulder, the more likely the bases will remain. It should be noted, 
however, that although low cost could be a contributing factor, it is not necessarily a deciding factor. 
If  the United States really needs a particular base, it will pay a good deal of  money. It is difﬁcult to 
ﬁnd cases in which the United States failed to secure an overseas base because they lacked funding. 
Rather, what prevented the host countries from extending U.S. presence was the host countries’ 
domestic pressures to end U.S. presence. Here is one example from the Philippines. The United States 
considered their bases in the Philippines one of  their most important and agreed to pay $200 million 
per annum40 in the August 1991 agreement. However, after the downfall of  the dictator Ferdinand 
Marcos in 1986, the new reformist government headed by Corazón Aquino was ‘heavily cross-pressured 
by activist, antibase NGOs and populist politicians who had been its principal backers in the anti-
Marcos struggle’.41 Consequently, the extension of  U.S. presence became increasingly difficult and 
eventually ended.
One could also think of  a different case in which the strategic value of  a base is low, but because of  
the low cost of  stationing troops, the United States decides to stay nonetheless. What might happen 
in this case is that if  the host country stopped providing host nation support, the United States would 
leave. Some argue that Japan fits into this category.42 However, the strategic value of  Japan perhaps 
is not that low. China needs to be watched closely as its economic and military strengths are growing. 
Japan provides the only homeport outside the United States for an aircraft carrier, and it also has the 
technologies to repair sophisticated weapons, etc. Added to that, Japan is a staunch ally of  the United 
States, and has one of  the most stable societies in the world. As such, the likelihood of  the Japanese 
government forcefully retaking U.S. bases is almost negligible. All in all, as long as the United States 
ﬁnds Japan strategically important and the cost of  stationing low, they have good reason to remain. 
At the same time, the growing military capabilities of  China should cause some worries. Japan is too 
close to China and U.S. forces stationed in Japan could be susceptible to a ﬁrst strike. If  the United States 
eventually decides that remaining in Japan would be dangerous, no matter how much Japan pays for the 
costs of  U.S. presence, American soldiers may leave.
6. Conclusion
This article attempts to provide a systematic analysis of  how U.S. overseas military presence begins, 
ends, and endures. There seems to be differing logic as to how bases are established and end.
In the establishment of  overseas bases, great power logic, among other factors, almost always 
prevails. This is dominated by the structure of  the international system in which powerful countries 
have the initiative. Strategic interests of  the United States, as well as shared strategic interests between 
the United States and the host countries, render base establishment. The ways in which foreign presence 
end, however, involve different factors. In some instances, termination could be dictated by domestic 
politics of  host nations. Host countries sometimes reject U.S. presence despite huge ﬁnancial support. 
And if  nationalism, noise pollution, and accidents are severe enough, monetary compensation will 
39　U.S. Department of  Defense, 2004 Statistical Compendium to the Allied Contributions, E – 4.
40　Sanders, America’s Overseas Garrisons, 125.
41　Calder, Base Politics, 147.
42　Calder argues, ‘[s]ome analysts suggests that “if  the U.S. ever leaves Japan, it will be because Japan ‘turns out 
the lights’” —cuts support payments rather than directly requests withdrawal—and there is potential truth in 
this statement’. See his Base Politics, 189.
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never be enough, whatever the amount. The question of  why bases persist is relevant to the issue of  
why alliances endure and the more general need to hedge against uncertainties in the future security 
environment. In addition, the sphere of  inﬂuence and the low cost of  stationing U.S. troops affect base 
endurance.
Some may argue that the logic of  U.S. presence can be explained by the balance of  power of  the 
international system alone. Others suggest the importance of  host countries’ domestic politics in 
explaining U.S. withdrawal. I do not disagree with these views. I argue, however, that focusing either on 
international system or domestic politics alone is insufﬁcient. As such, unlike neorealism that relies only 
on one level of  analysis (i.e., the international level), I look at both international and domestic interests 
of  the United States and host nations, which proves to be better for understanding the base issue.
Closely related to the topic discussed here, in November 2011, the United States announced that it 
would deploy 2,500 troops in Australia as a way to check China’s rise.43 This leads us to ask additional 
questions such as: Where should the United States station troops? How many troops should the United 
States maintain abroad?
In this article, I do not discuss where and how many U.S. troops should be stationed. But I present 
the argument called ‘off-shore balancing’.44 Both in theory and practice, it argues that America should 
basically retreat from the world. But only when there is a need to prevent the rise of  a regional hegemon 
should the United States return to intervene. This differs from isolationist thinking.
One could interpret the recent U.S. decision to station troops in Australia as evidence that opposes 
offshore balancing thinking. This is because offshore balancing emphasizes leaner U.S. commitment 
abroad to make a good use of  limited American resources. To be sure, it would be cheaper for the United 
States to have China’s neighboring countries deal with China’s growth, and only if  hostilities escalate 
would the United States enhance its presence in the region. Of  course there might be other compelling 
rationales for the recent American decision. In any event, exploring the validity of  offshore balancing 
would be an interesting area for future investigation as it closely relates to U.S. overseas military 
presence both in theory and practice.
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